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I. INTRODUCTION
In the United States, the relationship between investors and the
managers of public companies is governed by a combination of state
and federal law. Traditionally, state corporate law' has provided the
substantive rules that govern the relationship between management
and investors. Federal law, on the other hand, has provided rules re-
quiring public companies to provide investors with information. Al-
though one may argue that the federal government has become more
involved in providing substantive rules for the governance of public
companies in recent years, 2 the distinction between how state law and
federal law affect the governance of public companies remains true in
most respects.3
Despite the central role state corporate law plays in the govern-
ance of public firms and despite the intense focus legal academia
places on state corporate law (evidenced by the in-depth treatment of
the subject in casebooks, legal hornbooks, and law review articles),
public companies are not required to disclose information about the
1. This Article defines state corporate law as a state's statutory provisions and case
law regarding the organization and governance of a corporation and the ability of
investors to make use of the civil process to police management misfeasance and
malfeasance.
2. "The federal regime had until [the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002] consisted prima-
rily of disclosure requirements rather than substantive corporate governance
mandates, which were traditionally left to state corporate law." Roberta Romano,
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Making of Quack Corporate Governance, 114
YALE L.J. 1521, 1523 (2005). For example, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act requires cer-
tain board member to be independent directors (by requiring members of the au-
dit committee to be independent directors) and prohibits the corporation from
making loans to directors. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 78j-l(m)(3), 78m.
3. See Lucian A. Bebchuk & Assaf Hamdani, Vigorous Race or Leisurely Walk: Re-
considering the Competition over Corporate Charters, 112 YALE L.J. 553, 553
(2002) ('In the United States, most corporate law issues are left for the state, and
corporations are free to choose where to incorporate and thus which state's corpo-
rate law system will govern their affairs.").
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corporate law of their respective states of incorporation in their regu-
lar disclosures to the market (i.e., the disclosures companies first
make when they first go public and the annual and quarterly disclo-
sures they must make thereafter). The message to the investor is
clear: If you want to know how state corporate law affects the public
company, you must gather this information yourself.
Of course, gathering this information would be relatively simple if
all public companies were subject to one corporate law. However, they
are not. Although the State of Delaware may dominate the market for
incorporation of public firms, roughly forty percent of public firms in
the U.S. incorporate in states other than Delaware, 4 and nearly every
jurisdiction in the United States is the state of incorporation for at
least one public company. 5
The implicit assumption of our current disclosure regime is that
there is insufficient justification for requiring disclosure of state cor-
porate law. In this Article, I challenge that assumption and question
why we do not require public companies to disclose specific informa-
tion on state corporate law. Indeed, because arguments against
mandatory disclosure of state corporate law are not particularly
strong, and because the market would receive significant benefits
from such disclosures, I conclude that we should require public compa-
nies to disclose certain aspects of state corporate law as part of the
regular disclosures they make to the market.
Requiring public companies to disclose any information is contro-
versial. There has been strong opposition from some legal scholars to
any kind of mandatory disclosure for public companies. 6 The scholars
who call for the elimination of mandatory disclosure subscribe to the
idea that regulators are in a relatively poor position to determine the
scope and content of a socially optimal disclosure regime. They argue
that if public companies desired to exploit the market for capital, they
would provide the market with the information the market de-
4. See Lucian A. Bebchuk & Alma Cohen, Firms' Decisions Where to Incorporate, 46
J.L. & ECON. 383, 389 (2003) (stating that, based on data through the end of
1999, fifty-eight percent of public corporations are incorporated in Delaware).
5. See id. at 395 (Table 5) (based on statistics through the end of 1999, North Da-
kota was the only state that was not a state of incorporation for at least one
public company).
6. The scholars most closely associated with this position are George Stigler and
George Benston. For good summaries and critiques of the works of Stigler and
Benston, see Merritt B. Fox, Retaining Mandatory Securities Disclosure: Why Is-
suer Choice Is Not Investor Empowerment, 85 VA. L. REV. 1335, 1369-95 (1999);
Roberta Romano, Empowering Investors: A Market Approach to Securities Regu-
lation, 107 YALE L.J. 2359, 2372-81 (1998); Joel Seligman, The Historical Need
for a Mandatory Corporate Disclosure System, 9 J. CORP. L. 1 (1983).
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manded. 7 For this group of scholars, a voluntary disclosure system
would be the best way to achieve socially optimal disclosure.
Another group of scholars stops short of calling for the elimination
of mandatory disclosure but argues the current system is in need of
reform.8 These scholars concede the need for mandatory disclosure
rules but argue the federal government should not hold a monopoly on
the authority to make these rules.9 They propose that each of the va-
rious states should be allowed to regulate the disclosures of public
companies.1O A public company would choose the state it feels pro-
vides optimal disclosure rules by incorporating in that state and sub-
jecting itself to that state's securities laws."' The proponents of this
system, borrowing from the literature on the competition for corporate
charters,12 argue that competition between the states for incorpora-
tion revenues would result in a disclosure regime that at least fairly
approximates a socially optimal one.13
Finally, there are scholars who support our current federal
mandatory disclosure regime. 14 These scholars argue that eliminat-
ing mandatory disclosure rules altogether and relying on market
forces ignores the real possibility of market failure. 15 They further
argue that those who call for a competitive system of state disclosure
regimes fail to recognize that the states may have little incentive to
participate in such a competition and that the resulting disclosure re-
gimes would have a bias towards underdisclosure.16
7. See Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Mandatory Disclosure and the
Protection of Investors, 70 VA. L. REV. 669, 683-85 (1984).
8. See Stephen J. Choi & Andrew T. Guzman, Portable Reciprocity: Rethinking the
International Reach of Securities Regulation, 71 S. CAL. L. REv. 903 (1998); Ro-
mano, supra note 6; Paul G. Mahoney, The Exchange as Regulator, 83 Va. L. Rev.
1453 (1997).
9. See Romano, supra note 6, at 2362 ("As a competitive legal market supplants a
monopolist federal agency in the fashioning of regulation, it would produce rules
more aligned with the preferences of investors, whose decisions drive the capital
market.").
10. Id. at 2365 (suggesting competition should be allowed among "the fifty states, the
District of Columbia, and the federal government").
11. Id. at 2366 ("[Plromoters of firms will find they can obtain a lower cost of capital
by choosing the regime that investors prefer.").
12. See id. at 2383-88 (discussing the literature on competition for corporate charters
among the states and its implications to securities regulation).
13. See id. at 2365-66 ("Competing regulators would make fewer policy mistakes
than a monopolistic regulator .... ").
14. See Seligman, supra note 6; Fox, supra note 6.
15. See John C. Coffee, Jr., Market Failure and the Economic Case for a Mandatory
Disclosure System, 70 VA. L. REV. 717 (1984).
16. See Fox, supra note 6, at 1417 ("There are a number of market failures associated
with [a competitive system of state disclosure regimes] that are likely to result in
most issuers underdisclosing.").
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In this Article, I do not take a position on the more general issue of
the propriety of a federal mandatory disclosure regime for public com-
panies. A federal mandatory disclosure regime is a fact of life in
America, and, for now at least, public companies and scholars need to
work within that rubric. 17 However, one clear lesson to be learned
from the debate on mandatory disclosure is the importance of engag-
ing in critical review of the content and scope of the information we
require companies to disclose. Indeed, when regulators substitute
their judgment for that of a competitive market, there needs to be fre-
quent and robust debate on their decisions. The only hope for such a
system to even come close to achieving socially optimal disclosure is
through continual discussion and review of the scope and content of
mandatory disclosure.' 8 In this Article, I attempt to lay the ground-
work for further discussion and debate on requiring public companies
to disclose information about the corporate law of their respective
states of incorporation.
The content of a public company's disclosures should provide inves-
tors with information that will aid them in determining whether to
invest in the securities of a public company and, if they do invest, how
much to pay for these securities. Using this information, investors
can protect themselves from investment risks by either refusing to in-
vest in a company or by adjusting the price they are willing to pay for
the securities in order to accommodate for the risk.19 When investors
price securities based on certain information, they are not only pro-
tecting themselves-they are also helping to incorporate that informa-
tion into the market price of the securities. When the market prices of
securities reflect all relevant information, the economy as a whole
benefits from a more efficient allocation of investment capital.20
17. See Troy A. Paredes, Blinded by the Light: Information Overload and Its Conse-
quences for Securities Regulation, 81 WASH. U. L.Q. 417, 417 (2003) (recognizing
that "the debate has been settled for decades, with mandatory disclosure winning
the day"); Fox, supra note 6, at 1339 (stating that despite the debate, there was
now a "rough consensus.., with.., most economics-oriented legal academics...
concluding that, on balance, mandatory disclosure should be retained").
18. Disclosure is socially optimal when the benefits of disclosure meets or exceeds the
costs of the disclosure. See Fox, supra note 6, at 1339. Of course, this definition
provides us with no answer; rather, it just provides an invitation to a deeper cost-
benefit analysis.
19. As an example, Professor Roberto Romano stated: "[Als long as investors are in-
formed of the governing legal regime, if promoters choose a regime that excul-
pates them from fraud, investors will either not invest in the firm at all or will
require a higher return on the investment (that is, pay less for the security) ... .
Romano, supra note 6, at 2366.
20. See Merritt B. Fox, Randall Morck, Bernard Yeung & Artyom Durnev, Law,
Share Price Accuracy, and Economic Performance: The New Evidence, 102 MicH.
L. REV. 331, 334 (2003) (stating that studies "strongly suggest that greater share
price accuracy does lead to enhanced efficiency in the real economy").
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Mandatory disclosure plays an important role in this process by pro-
viding the market with the relevant information it needs. 2 1
The information investors use to evaluate a company may be re-
lated to the future prospects of the company's main line of business, or
it may be related to the possibility that the managers of the company
will use their control over the company to expropriate benefits for
themselves at the expense of the company and the shareholders. This
Article argues that information on state corporate law is an integral
piece of the overall mix of information investors need to evaluate the
risk of management expropriation in public companies. It further ar-
gues that mandatory disclosure of state corporate law is the most effi-
cient way of disseminating this important information to the market.
The remainder of the Article proceeds as follows: Part II presents
how our current mandatory disclosure regulations generally ignore in-
formation on state corporate law; Part III makes the case that infor-
mation on state corporate law is an important part of the information
that investors in public companies need to evaluate investment risk;
Part IV argues that mandatory disclosure of state corporate law would
reduce information costs in the market; Part V presents and discusses
some of the costs of a rule requiring disclosure of state corporate law
and suggests how we could draft the rule to minimize some of these
costs; and Part VI concludes.
II. THE DISCLOSURE OF STATE CORPORATE LAW
UNDER OUR CURRENT SYSTEM
Although federal disclosure regulations require public companies
to disclose a vast amount of information to the investing public, they
require disclosure of almost no information about state corporate law.
Regulation S-K, which provides the specifics of the disclosures a public
company must make, 22 has only one item that explicitly calls for dis-
closure of a provision of state corporate law. Item 202 requires compa-
nies to disclose "[l]iability to further calls or to assessment by the
21. See id. (stating that their study suggests "mandatory disclosure does in fact in-
crease the amount of meaningful information reflected in share prices").
22. When a company sells securities through a public offering, the Securities Act of
1933 ("1933 Act") requires it to make certain disclosures to investors. Once a
company becomes a public company, the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 ("1934
Act") requires it to make regular disclosures of certain information to the invest-
ing public. These regular disclosures generally consist of quarterly reports and
annual reports. Although disclosure of information for a public offering is gov-
erned by the 1933 Act and the continuing disclosure of information by public com-
panies is governed by the 1934 Act, Regulation S-K specifies the nature of the
information that must be disclosed for both disclosure circumstances. For a more
detailed discussion of the scope and disclosure requirements of the 1933 Act, the
1934 Act and the role of Regulation S-K, see THoMAs LEE HAZEN, THE LAW OF
SECURITIEs REGULATION §§ 1.0, 1.2[3], 3.4, 9.1, 9.4 (5th ed. 2006).
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registrant and for liabilities of the registrant imposed on its stockhold-
ers under state statutes .... "23 Item 202 also requires disclosure of
the terms of the capital stock (where capital stock is being registered),
including certain rights that might be granted under state law, such
as voting rights and preemption rights, although state law is never
expressly mentioned. 24
There are other items in Regulation S-K that may require the dis-
closure of state corporate law, but may also refer to exchange rules,
provisions in the company's organizational documents, or a private
agreement between the company and members of management or
some other third party. For example, Item 308 requires the company
to make "[a] statement of management's responsibility for establish-
ing and maintaining adequate internal control over financial report-
ing for the registrant . "... 25 Item 702 requires a statement of the
"general effect of any statute, charter provision, bylaws, contract or
other arrangements under which any controlling persons, director or
officer of the registrant is insured or indemnified in any manner
against liability which he may incur in his capacity as such."26 Item
201 requires disclosure of any "restrictions ... that currently materi-
ally limit the registrant's ability to pay such dividends or that the reg-
istrant reasonably believes are likely to limit materially the future
payment of dividends on the common equity .."27 Item 201 may
refer to state corporate law restrictions on the ability of companies to
make distributions to shareholders unless the company's financial sit-
uation meets certain conditions, but it may also refer to charter or
bylaw restrictions or even to restrictions in debt instruments or other
loan agreements.
It seems as though the federal disclosure requirements have actu-
ally marginalized the importance of state law to the investors of public
companies by the glaring lack of any reference to state law. Indeed,
there are several places where Regulation S-K addresses issues that
may implicate state corporate law, but fails to require any disclosure
of state corporate law. For example, Item 101 requires disclosure of
"the year in which the registrant was organized and its form of organi-
zation," 28 but it does not require the issuer to disclose why it organ-
23. 17 C.F.R. § 229.202(a)(ix) (2007) (emphasis added).
24. 17 C.F.R. § 229.202(a) (2007). Item 501 specifically mentions state law in when it
requires "[a]ny legend or statement required by the law of any state in which the
securities are to be offered." 17 C.F.R. § 229.501(b)(6) (2007). However, this item
addresses state Blue Sky Laws, not what we would traditionally consider to be
state corporate law. In addition, this provision does not necessarily refer to or
even include the issuer's state of incorporation.
25. 17 C.F.R. § 229.308(a)(1) (2007).
26. 17 C.F.R. § 229.702 (2007) (emphasis added).
27. 17 C.F.R. § 229.201(c)(1) (2007).
28. 17 C.F.R. § 229.101(a)(1) (2007).
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ized in a particular state. Item 404 requires disclosure of the
"registrant's policies and procedures for the review, approval, or ratifi-
cation of [related party transactions],"29 but the regulation makes no
mention of how those procedures are influenced or supplemented by
state corporate law.
Item 202 of Regulation S-K provides one of the most glaring exam-
ples of the marginalization of state corporate law in the federal regula-
tion of public company disclosures. It requires the company to discuss
and describe any provision in its charter or bylaws that would hinder
a change of control of the company.3 0 However, this item specifically
excludes a charter or bylaw provision that may be mandatory under
state law.31
Regulation S-K is concerned with the corporate governance of pub-
lic companies. In fact, there are many provisions in S-K that deal with
corporate governance issues. Items 307 and 308 address the com-
pany's internal controls over disclosure and financial reporting.3 2
Items 402 and 403 require detailed disclosure of the compensation of
the company's principal executives and their ownership of the com-
pany's securities.3 3 Item 406 requires disclosure of any code of ethics
regarding corporate governance that the company has adopted for its
principal executive officers.3 4 However, these items do not explicitly
require the disclosure of state corporate law rules or standards. In
fact, there is an entire provision in Regulation S-K that deals exclu-
sively with "corporate governance," but it makes no mention of state
corporate law rules or standards.35
Although Regulation S-K requires a public company to make dis-
closures relevant to corporate governance, it does not require any dis-
closure about many aspects of state corporate law that would provide
a better overall picture of the corporate governance of the company.
For example, state law governs shareholder derivative lawsuits. In-
formation about the state corporate law's approach to a demand that
may have to be made by a plaintiff before initiating a lawsuit, the ade-
quacy of board review of such a demand, and a board's refusal of a
demand would provide the investor with a more complete picture of
the company's corporate governance environment. Our current disclo-
sure regime does not require a public company to disclose any infor-
mation about state law regulation of derivative lawsuits.
29. 17 C.F.R. § 229.404(a)(instructions) (2007).
30. 17 C.F.R. § 229.202(a)(5) (2007).
31. Id.
32. 17 C.F.R. §§ 229.307, 229.308 (2007).
33. 17 C.F.R. §§ 229.402, 229.403 (2007).
34. 17 C.F.R. § 229.406 (2007).
35. 17 C.F.R. § 229.407 (2007).
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State law also defines the fiduciary duties of directors, officers, and
controlling shareholders. An understanding of how the courts of the
state of incorporation define and shape fiduciary duties would provide
investors with a more complete picture of the corporate governance of
the company. Our current disclosure regime does not require a public
company to disclose any information about state law fiduciary duty
standards in any one of the many contexts that it might arise. In fact,
our current disclosure requirements do not mandate disclosure of
state laws governing shareholder rights to inspect corporate books
and records, dissenters' rights, protection of non-shareholder constitu-
encies, and other corporate governance issues as part of a public com-
pany's regular disclosures.
In addition, although investors may be able glean certain aspects
of state corporate law from the disclosure of the company's articles of
incorporation, bylaws, and other corporate documents, our disclosure
regime puts the onus on the investor to pour through the disclosure
documents rather than on the company to disclose this information in
an organized, easy-to-read manner.
Thus, our current disclosure regime considers corporate govern-
ance information to be important for investors, but it treats state cor-
porate law as largely irrelevant to the governance of public firms or
insufficiently important to merit the costs of disclosure.
III. THE IMPORTANCE OF STATE CORPORATE LAW TO
INVESTORS IN PUBLIC COMPANIES
If state corporate law were unimportant or irrelevant to investors
in public companies, it would be foolish to require public companies to
disclose any information about the corporate law of its state of incor-
poration. A group of prominent economists have explained, however,
that corporate law is indeed important to investors:
When their rights are better protected by the law, outside investors are will-
ing to pay more for financial assets such as equity and debt. They pay more
because they recognize that, with better legal protection, more of the firm's
profits would come back to them as interest or dividends as opposed to being
expropriated by the entrepreneur who controls the firm. By limiting expropri-
ation, the law raises the price that securities fetch in the marketplace. 3 6
Thus, if the corporate law of a particular state efficiently limits ex-
propriation by those in control of the firm, investors will be willing to
pay relatively more for the securities of a company that is organized
under the laws of that state. Conversely, if the corporate law of a par-
ticular state fails to efficiently limit expropriation by those in control
of the firm, investors will pay relatively less for the securities of a com-
pany incorporated in that state. In either case, investors will place
36. Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer & Robert Vishny,
Investor Protection and Corporate Valuation, 57 J. FIN. 1147, 1147 (2002).
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importance on information about how the law of a company's state of
incorporation protects their rights.
This section discusses some possible challenges to the proposition
that state corporate law is important to the investors of public compa-
nies and also presents the evidence in support of that proposition.
A. The "triviality" or irrelevance of state corporate law
Professor Bernard Black has argued that state corporate law is
trivial. 3 7 Professor Black's "triviality hypothesis" is a provocative
claim that, at first glance, may seem to advise against mandatory dis-
closure of state corporate law-after all, state corporate law is "triv-
ial." However, upon closer analysis, the triviality hypothesis, even if
true, does not lend support to an argument against mandatory disclo-
sure. In fact, the triviality hypothesis may support an argument in
favor of requiring public companies to disclose certain aspects of state
corporate law.
Professor Black's thesis is that much of state corporate law is triv-
ial because corporate law rules fall into one of the following four
categories:
" "market mimicking" rules-rules that managers and investors
would have agreed upon if they had considered drafting for the
particular contingency; 38
" "avoidable" rules-default rules that managers and investors
can vary through the charter or bylaw provisions, or rules they
can avoid through reincorporation in another state;39
* "changeable" rules-rules managers and/or investors could
change over time through lobbying efforts; 40 or
* "unimportant" rules-rules the company could comply with "at
[a] nominal cost, or involv[ing] situations that almost never
occur."
4 1
Even assuming Professor Black's triviality hypothesis is correct, it
does not justify an argument against mandatory disclosure of state
corporate law. With respect to market-mimicking rules, it is difficult,
37. Bernard S. Black, Is Corporate Law Trivial?: A Political and Economic Analysis,
84 Nw. U. L. REV. 542, 544 (1990) ("[T]he 'triviality hypothesis' [is] that, appear-
ances notwithstanding, state corporate law is trivial: it does not prevent compa-
nies-managers and investors together-from establishing any set of corporate
governance rules they want."); id. at 562 ("The positive claim ... is that all state
corporate law rules arguably fit within one or more of the four categories of trivial
rules.").
38. Id. at 552-55.
39. Id. at 555-59.
40. Id. at 559-60.
41. Id. at 560.
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if not impossible, to say for certain whether a rule is market-mimick-
ing.42 Of course, scholars often make arguments that corporate law
provides the rules to which the parties would have agreed in the ma-
jority of transactions. But what if a particular rule is not market-
mimicking? In such a case, disclosure of that rule allows the market
to fully incorporate its cost. Clearly, then, if we justify non-disclosure
of state corporate law because it is market-mimicking, we run the risk
of exacerbating the costs of our mistakes. Not only do we run the risk
that the law creates transaction costs because it is not market-mim-
icking, we also run the risk that these costs will not be fully incorpo-
rated into the price of the securities because we have not required
disclosure. 4 3
With respect to the remaining categories of trivial corporate law-
avoidable and changeable rules-Professor Black essentially argues
that corporate law is trivial as long as its rules are not mandatory or,
if they are mandatory, they can be changed through political pressure
or avoided by reincorporating in another state.44 In other words,
given enough time (for political forces to work) and space (for changing
the jurisdiction of incorporation), corporate law is trivial.
This argument, however, necessarily recognizes the importance
and relevance of state corporate law. The argument that corporate
law in the U.S. is trivial because parties can avoid the less preferred
rules of one state by reincorporating in another state necessarily rec-
ognizes the non-triviality of corporate law in any one particular state.
In addition, the argument that corporate law is trivial because it will
change over time necessarily recognizes that it is non-trivial at any
particular point in time-especially if change is not easy because of
bureaucracy or political opposition or because managers and investors
may disagree whether the law needs to be changed.
In a similar vein, Professors Robert Thompson and Hillary Sale
have made the case that federal law has made state corporate law ir-
relevant to a certain extent.4 5 They claim that federal securities law
now serves as a substitute for many state corporate law claims.46
They argue that "federal securities law and enforcement via securities
fraud class actions today have become the most visible means of regu-
lating corporate governance."4 7 They further argue that federal law
42. Professor Black would at least concede that we could rarely say for certain
whether a rule is market-mimicking. Id. at 552.
43. See infra Part IV.G (discussing the costs of unincorporated corporate law
information).
44. See supra notes 37-41 and accompanying text.
45. See Robert B. Thompson & Hillary A. Sale, Securities Fraud as Corporate Gov-
ernance: Reflections Upon Federalism, 56 VAND. L. REV. 859 (2003).
46. Id. at 861 (arguing that "corporate governance outside of [acquisition and self-
dealing transactions] has passed to federal law").
47. See id. at 860.
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addresses the conduct of executive officers more directly than state
corporate law48 and that federal law makes a significant contribution
to defining the directors' duty of care4 9 and to policing the directors'
duty-of-loyalty obligations. 50
Professors Thompson and Sale, however, stop short of arguing that
state corporate law has been supplanted completely by federal law. In
fact, they recognize that state law still plays a role in the corporate
governance of public companies. 5 1 Thus, even if federal law is now
playing a greater role in defining and policing substantive areas of
corporate governance that were formerly within the exclusive realm of
state corporate law, state corporate law is still relevant to public com-
panies. Eventually, state corporate law may be directly supplanted by
federal corporate law. Until then, the mere existence of a proactive
federal regime does not lend much support to an argument against the
mandatory disclosure of state corporate law.
Professor J. Robert Brown has also argued that state corporate law
is irrelevant. 52 The essence of Professor Brown's thesis is that state
corporate law is irrelevant to public companies because "most states
... do not impose meaningful duties on managers of public compa-
nies."5 3 This claim raises an interesting question: If the corporate law
of all states is simply "bad," does that fact support an argument
against requiring a public company to disclose certain aspects of the
law of it state of incorporation? This Article contends that the answer
to this question is unequivocally no. In fact, Professor Brown's claim,
if true, would only speak against mandatory disclosure when the cor-
porate laws of all states provide equally bad (or good) protection for
investors and there is no possibility for the development of differences
between the states. In other words, only formal uniformity of corpo-
48. See id. at 877 ("And, in recognition of where the locus of today's governance is,
federal law imposes obligations directly on officers, bypassing the intermediaries
of the board.").
49. See id. at 873-77; id. at 904 ("In theory, state law duty of care litigation continues
to afford relief to these shareholders, but as disclosure and securities fraud litiga-
tion have expanded, and as Delaware has raised the bar for care claims, the bal-
ance has shifted to a larger federal role."); see also J. Robert Brown, Jr., The
Irrelevance of State Corporate Law in the Governance of Public Companies, 38 U.
RICH. L. REV. 317, 375 (2004) ("Sarbanes-Oxley forces the board to be more in-
formed, largely supplanting Delaware law concerning the duty to monitor.").
50. See Thompson & Sale, supra note 45, at 877 (noting "the section of [federal law]
that regulates the fiduciary duty of loyalty by banning corporate loans to execu-
tive officers and directors").
51. See id. at 909-10 ("Corporate governance, once almost the exclusive domain of
state law, is now very much a function shared by the federal and state
governments.").
52. See Brown, supra note 49.
53. See id. at 348.
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rate law would obviate the need for mandatory disclosure of state cor-
porate law.5 4
B. Relying on voluntary disclosure as a proxy for relevance
One might argue that the market should decide on the importance
of state corporate law. If disclosure of state corporate law were so-
cially optimal-i.e., if the issuer's costs of disclosure did not exceed the
benefits to the investors-then issuers would voluntarily disclose the
information because the market would demand it.55 However, this ar-
gument necessarily assumes that the interests of the management
and the investors are aligned when disclosure is socially optimal,
which is not necessarily true. Professor Merritt Fox has argued that
the voluntary disclosure of information by a public company does not
depend on whether the disclosure is socially optimal.5 6 Instead, vol-
untary disclosure depends on the private costs of disclosure-namely,
the marginal costs of disclosure to the managers versus the marginal
benefit of the disclosure to the managers.5 7
In other words, the managers of a public company will not always
disclose the information that the investors want. The disclosure of
some information by the company, although socially optimal, might
reduce the private interests of the management. Management is es-
sentially presented with a choice. If, on one hand, the managers dis-
closed the information, they would lose whatever private benefits they
received from non-disclosure. If, on the other hand, the managers did
not disclose this information, the market would penalize them. The
investors would assume the worst and discount the price they were
willing to pay for the issuer's securities, increasing the costs of capital
for the company. 5S The increased costs of capital would adversely af-
fect the company's bottom line and, thereby, penalize the managers by
reducing their incentive-based compensation and placing their jobs in
54. See infra Part IV.F (discussing the uniformity of state corporate law).
55. See Fox, supra note 6, at 1339 (stating that opponents to mandatory disclosure
"argued that market forces alone could provide sufficient incentives for issuers to
disclose at their socially optimal levels").
56. See id. at 1344. More specifically, Professor Fox was discussing what type of dis-
closure regime issuers would choose if they had several options, as opposed to our
current system of one federal securities law. Id. The basic analysis, however, is
equally valid for a voluntary disclosure regime.
57. Id.
58. See FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF
CORPORATE LAw 288 (1991) (stating that investors would reason "if the firm had
anything good to say for itself it would do so"); Paredes, supra note 17, at 421
(stating that opponents of mandatory disclosure argue "a company will volunta-
rily disclose information that investors demand in order to reduce its cost of capi-
tal and avoid any discount that the market might apply to the company's stock
price").
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jeopardy. 59 When the value of the private benefits they would lose
because of disclosure exceeds the penalty they suffer for non-disclo-
sure,6 0 the managers would choose not to disclose-even if disclosure
would be better for the investors. 6 1
These dynamics create a challenging quandary for policymakers.
Although we might not want a system that relied completely on volun-
tary disclosure,6 2 we also do not want to mandate disclosure of infor-
mation that investors do not consider important enough to justify the
costs. 6 3 Ideally, we would only interfere in a market decision on the
disclosure of certain information when management's private benefit
of non-disclosure exceeded the market penalty for non-disclosure. Un-
fortunately, it is impossible for us to determine with any certainty
when this occurs. We can merely try to recognize the conditions that
increase the likelihood management will not make socially optimal
disclosure of certain information. Disclosure of state corporate law is
arguably one of those instances where there is a significant likelihood
management will not make socially optimal disclosure.
Management may be unwilling to make socially optimal disclosure
of state corporate law for two main reasons. The first reason is that
the corporate law of the state of incorporation might unduly favor
management. If the corporate law of the state of incorporation fa-
vored management, investors would tend to prefer full disclosure of
such information, depending, of course, on the costs to the issuer, be-
cause it helps them to better evaluate the risk of expropriation. 64 In
contrast, managers would tend to prefer not disclosing this informa-
tion because making investors aware of the pro-management nature
of the law may prompt them to demand changes, which would then
reduce managers' private benefits. Of course, information about state
corporate law is available to investors without disclosure from the
company, 65 but whether the market actually researches and acquires
59. See EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 58, at 290 (stating that the "self-inter-
est" of managers leads them to make voluntary disclosure).
60. Competent managers can reduce the affects of the increased capital costs for the
firm by increasing the firm's competitiveness in other markets, such as the prod-
uct market or the labor market.
61. See Fox, supra note 6, at 1344 ("[M]anagers will choose the regime that requires
the issuer to disclose closest to the level at which the marginal increase in cost to
the managers.., equals the marginal increase in benefit to them . . ").
62. Professor Fox claims that the level of disclosure under a voluntary disclosure sys-
tem will inevitably fall below the socially optimal level of disclosure. Id. at 1344.
63. See Geoffrey A. Manne, The Hydraulic Theory of Disclosure Regulation and Other
Costs of Disclosure, 58 ALA. L. REV. 473, 481 (2007) ("[Aldditional disclosure also
imposes increasing costs on firms, and even if we accept the argument that firms
voluntarily under-produce information, an optimal information disclosure regime
would surely not require disclosure of all private information.").
64. See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
65. See infra Part I.C.
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this information depends on the costs of acquiring the information. 66
Managers trying to hide the advantages that state corporate law pro-
vides them rely on these information costs to keep the market
ignorant.6 7
We might expect that managers would be more than willing to vol-
untarily disclose information about state corporate law if the law fa-
vored investors' interests. In fact, we might expect them to advertise
it.68 As a practical matter, however, this is unlikely. No state has a
corporate law that does not have at least some provisions that favor
the interests of management. Of course management would want to
disclose the aspects of state corporate law that benefit investors with-
out disclosing those that favor management. However, this type of
selective disclosure is unlikely because it would be misleading.6 9
The second reason why management might be unwilling to make
socially optimal disclosure of state corporate law is that liability for
inaccurate disclosures under current securities laws creates a general
preference for less disclosure, rather than more. "[Slecurities laws
themselves reduce the amount of information that is provided by issu-
ers because they impose significant liability for the production of mis-
information."7 0 Thus, because the voluntary disclosure of any
information, including, but not limited to, information on state corpo-
rate law, is less likely under our current legal and regulatory environ-
ment, it may be an unwise policy decision to rely on voluntary
disclosure.
C. A substitute for disclosure of state corporate law?-
disclosure of firm-level rules
One argument against the mandatory disclosure of state corporate
law is that firm-level rules are more important to investors than state
corporate law and that companies are currently required to disclose
their firm-level rules.71 It is possible that the corporate law of a par-
ticular state may provide little protection for shareholders, but the
firm may choose to provide better protection through its charter, by-
66. See infra Part IV.D.
67. See infra Part IV.G for a discussion of whether the information costs discourage
the market from acquiring this information.
68. See EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 58, at 288 (noting that "[a] firm with a
good project ... would disclose more and more").
69. Managers might also choose not to disclose simply because they are "overconfi-
dent in their own abilities" and "feel that disclosure [is] simply unnecessary and
bothersome." Frank B. Cross & Robert A. Prentice, The Economic Value of Secur-
ities Regulation, 28 CARDOZO L. REV. 333, 341 (2006).
70. Edmund W. Kitch, The Theory and Practice of Securities Disclosure, 61 BROOK. L.
REV. 763, 770 (1995).
71. See 17 C.F.R. § 229.601 (2007) (Exhibit table) (requiring the disclosure of articles
of incorporation, bylaws, and codes of ethics as exhibits).
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laws, internal guidelines/policies, or other firm-level rules. Similarly,
the law may provide very protective default rules, but the firm may
choose to opt out of these rules. Under these circumstances, the inves-
tor is more concerned with the disclosure of firm-level rules than with
state corporate law.
In fact, a public company will disclose any deviation from the cor-
porate law default rules through the disclosure of its charter and by-
laws under Regulation S-K.72 However, since charter and bylaw
provisions do not always reflect mandatory provisions of state corpo-
rate law or even default rules from which the company has not opted
out, there are many aspects of state corporate law that affect the cor-
porate governance of public firms that are not revealed through disclo-
sure of firm-level rules.
For example, imagine that the corporate law of State X allows a
company to adopt a charter provision that exculpates directors for vio-
lations of the duty of care. 73 Although the exculpatory provision in
the charter might provide investors with important information about
the corporate governance of the firm, it does not make state corporate
law standards on the duty of care irrelevant. State corporate law
might still allow shareholder derivative suits to enjoin actions by the
directors that violate their duty of care. In addition, state corporate
law standards for the duty of care are still very relevant for the com-
pany that has not adopted the exculpatory charter provision.
Similarly, imagine that a public company incorporated in the State
of X has adopted a "poison pill" in the form of a rights plan.74 This
rights plan will be disclosed in the articles of incorporation and thus
available for investors through current mandatory disclosure rules. 75
However, the charter will not disclose the standards that a judge in
State X will use to review a decision by the board of directors on
whether to redeem the rights plan.76 It is not the rights plan alone,
but the rights plan along with state corporate law standards that pro-
vides the investors with a more accurate picture of their level of pro-
tection against management misconduct.77
72. Id.
73. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (1947).
74. See JESSE H. CHOPER, JOHN C. COFFEE, JR. & RONALD J. GILSON, CASES AND
MATERIALS ON CORPORATIONS 979 (6th ed. 2004) (stating that the "most popular
contemporary version" of the poison pill is known as the "Share Purchase Rights
Plan").
75. See supra note 71.
76. The literature discussing judicial review of poison pills and other defensive tac-
tics is extensive. For a good introduction, see WILLIAM A. KLEIN & JOHN C. COF-
FEE, JR., BUSINESS ORGANIZATION AND FINANCE LEGAL AND ECONOMIC PRINCIPLES
202-07 (10th ed. 2007); ARTHUR R. PINro & DOUGLAS M. BRANSON, UNDERSTAND-
ING CORPORATE LAw 347-59 (2d ed. 2004).
77. In this case, the misconduct would be management entrenchment.
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Thus, information on firm-level rules provides an integral piece of
the puzzle of the corporate governance picture of a firm, but it is not a
substitute for information on state corporate law.
D. Evidence of the importance of state corporate law-the
debate on the competition for corporate charters
The scholarship on the competition for corporate charters provides
strong evidence of the importance of state corporate law. It has been
suggested that states compete with one another to attract incorpora-
tions. 78 Some scholars posit that this competition has resulted in a
race to the bottom-the "bottom" being corporate law that provides
suboptimal protection for shareholders. 7 9 The scholars in the race-to-
the-bottom camp argue that the states have adjusted their corporate
laws to serve the interests of corporate managers in order to attract
incorporations and that the interests of the managers often conflict
with those of the shareholders.8 0 Some scholars argue that this race
to the bottom justifies a federal corporate law, or at least justifies ex-
pansion of federal law into areas that were once considered the exclu-
sive domain of state corporate law.S1
On the other side of the debate, there are scholars that have ar-
gued that the competition for charters between states has led to a race
to the top-the "top" being a corporate law that provides optimal pro-
tection for shareholders.8 2 They argue that in order to reduce the
costs of capital, companies will incorporate in a jurisdiction with a cor-
porate law that provides the greatest value.8 3 The scholars in this
camp would generally oppose a federal corporate law or the expansion
of federal law into what they view as traditionally state corporate law
78. For a more detailed summary of the state competition for corporate charters, see
Guhan Subramanian, The Influence of Antitakeover Statutes on Incorporation
Choice: Evidence on the "Race" Debate and Antitakeover Overreaching, 150 U. PA.
L. REV. 1795, 1797-1800, 1804-13 (2002); Bebchuk & Hamdani, supra note 3, at
561-63.
79. See, e.g., William L. Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections upon Dela-
ware, 83 YALE L.J. 663 (1974); Lucian Arye Bebchuck, Federalism and the Corpo-
ration: The Desirable Limits on State Competition in Corporate Law, 105 HARV.
L. REV. 1435 (1992).
80. See Subramanian, supra note 78, at 1798 (stating that Cary, Bebchuk, Cohen,
and Ferrell "have argued that states cater to managers ... resulting in a race to
the bottom").
81. Bebchuk & Hamdani, supra note 3, at 608 ("[C]ritics of state competition argue[ ]
that mandatory federal rules might be desirable with respect to corporate issues
for which competition might pressure states in undesirable directions.").
82. See, e.g., Ralph K. Winter, Jr., State Law, Shareholder Protection, and the Theory
of the Corporation, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 251, 256 (1977).
83. See Subramanian, supra note 78, at 1797-98 (stating that Winter, Easterbrook,
Fischel and Romano "have argued that states compete against each other to offer
laws that maximize shareholder value, resulting in a race to the top").
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issues. They argue that a federal corporate law would put an end to
the state competition for corporate charters, resulting in a suboptimal
corporate law.8 4
There seems to be no clear consensus regarding whether interstate
competition results in optimal or suboptimal corporate law. However,
the underlying premise of the debate, which is that state corporate
law affects the value of a company to investors,8 5 provides sufficient
support for my argument that state corporate law is relevant to inves-
tors of public companies.
More recent scholarship now challenges the proposition that an ac-
tive interstate competition for charters actually exists.8 6 However,
the absence of this competition does not undermine the claim that
state corporate law is important to investors-it merely undermines
the notion that corporate law in the U.S. is presumptively efficient
because it results from a competitive process.8 7
In fact, the possibility that an interstate competition for incorpora-
tions does not exist provides greater weight to an argument in favor of
mandatory disclosure of corporate law. Once the idea that corporate
law is a product of a competitive market is rejected, that law's effi-
ciency then becomes doubtful. However, mandatory disclosure of the
law to the market will allow the market to pass judgment on the effi-
cacy and efficiency of a particular law or rule through the incorpora-
tion of that law into the price of a security.8 8
In addition to facilitating accurate share pricing, a mandatory dis-
closure rule might also benefit the quality of corporate law in states
that do not compete for corporate charters. It has been argued that
states not competing for incorporations may "tend to have corporate
84. See Romano, supra note 6, at 2392.
85. See Robert Daines, The Incorporation Choices of IPO Firms, 77 N.Y.U. L. Rev.
1559, 1565-66 (2002) (stating that "each side [of the debate] agrees that legal
rules affect the creation or distribution of the firm's value and that firms there-
fore search the array of fifty potential legal regimes and select the regime with
the most favorable legal rules").
86. Professors Marcel Kahan and Ehud Kamar have argued that this interstate com-
petition for charters no longer exists, although it may have taken place in the
past. See Marcel Kahan & Ehud Kamar, The Myth of State Competition in Corpo-
rate Law, 55 STAN. L. REV. 679, 684 (2002). Professor Lucian Bebchuck and Assaf
Hamdani also challenge the idea that there is any real competition. See Bebchuk
& Hamdani, supra note 3, at 555 ("The alleged vigorous race among states vying
for incorporations, we argue, simply does not exist.").
87. Bebchuck and Hamdani explain the significance of their findings: "The absence of
strong competition undermines the basis for the view that Delaware's dominance
is the product of its winning a vigorous competition. Thus, the analysis implies
that the case for preferring state competition to mandatory federal rules is much
weaker than supporters of state competition have assumed." See Bebchuk &
Hamdani, supra note 3, at 558.
88. See supra notes 19-21 and accompanying text (providing a summary explanation
of accurate share pricing).
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laws that lack predictability, [that are] slow to copy innovations, and
. . . invest little in developing innovations on their own."8 9 If this is
the case, then to the extent mandatory disclosure of state corporate
law brings attention to, or raises awareness of these shortcomings, it
may put pressure on managers to reincorporate in another state, to
lobby for corporate law changes, or where possible, to remedy the
shortcomings through amendment of the company's organizational
documents.
E. Evidence of the importance of state corporate law-
empirical studies
In their influential article, Investor Protection and Corporate Valu-
ation, Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer,
and Robert Vishny ("LLSV") examined the effect of legal protection of
investors on the valuation of firms.90 They studied 539 firms in 27
different countries 91 and assessed the quality of legal protection of in-
vestors in these countries based on the origin of law (i.e., common law,
civil law, or other) and "antidirector rights."92 They concluded that
"poor shareholder protection is penalized with lower valuations."93 In
other words, the quality of a jurisdiction's legal protection of inves-
tors-its corporate law-affects the price investors are willing to pay
for a company's securities. This correlation between poor corporate
law and lower valuations of corporate assets clearly demonstrates the
importance of corporate law to investors.
Although the LLSV study compared the corporate laws of different
countries, not of the different U.S. states, the same principle should
apply to the corporate laws of the states. 94 If differences exist be-
tween the corporate laws of the states, then the LLSV study tells us
they should be as important to investors as the divergences between
the corporate laws of different nations. 95
89. See Kahan & Kamar, supra note 86, at 738.
90. La Porta et al., supra note 36.
91. Id. at 1154.
92. See id. at 1155-58.
93. See id. at 1168.
94. Although the various states are part of one larger nation, they have as much
sovereign power to determine the scope of their corporate laws as Italy, Japan,
and Germany, for example. There may be certain forces that discourage the vari-
ous states from diverging too far from each other. For example, a national securi-
ties market and close communications and interactions among the citizenry, the
commercial actors, and the lawmakers of the various states. However, these
forces do not necessarily ensure that significant divergences do not occur.
95. See Kahan & Kamar, supra note 86, at 682 ("Empirical evidence suggests that
[U.S. domestic] domicile choices affect the value of companies by several percent-
age points.").
20081
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
Professor Robert Daines conducted a study that focused specifi-
cally on the value of Delaware corporate law in comparison to the cor-
porate law of other states.96 He concluded that Delaware firms were
worth more relative to firms incorporated in other states and attrib-
uted the difference in value to the quality of Delaware law.9 7 Profes-
sor Daines' conclusions, if correct, provide direct support for the
argument that the corporate laws of the states are important to
investors.
Some scholars have criticized Professor Daines' conclusions.98 For
example, Professors Lucian Bebchuck and Allen Ferrell have argued
that the increased value of Delaware firms might be attributable to
variables other than Delaware corporate law. 99 Professor Guhan Sub-
ramanian found that the effect of Delaware corporate law on the value
of firms did not exist after 1996 and concluded that "Delaware law
does not improve market value in an economically meaningful
way."' 0 0
Empirical studies that show Delaware law increases, decreases, or
has no effect on the value of firms compared to the corporate laws of
other states are not dispositive of the issue of the relevance of corpo-
rate law to investors. The proposition that corporate law can affect
the value of firms, and is thus important to investors, is still largely
uncontroversial.O1 In addition, there are several possible reasons
why empirical studies might not show that the corporate law of a par-
ticular state creates a difference in value. One reason may be that
there are no substantial differences between the corporate laws of the
various states. However, such a reason would only support an argu-
ment against mandatory disclosure of state corporate law if the uni-
formity of these laws were formal and permanent, which is not the
case in the United States.10 2 A second reason why empirical studies
96. Robert Daines, Does Delaware Law Improve Firm Value?, 62 J. FIN. ECON. 525
(2001).
97. See id. at 532-35.
98. For a summary of these criticisms, see Guhan Subramanian, The Disappearing
Delaware Effect, 20 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 32, 34-36 (2004); Lucian Bebchuk, Alma
Cohen & Allen Ferrell, Does the Evidence Favor State Competition in Corporate
Law, 90 CAL. L. REV. 1775, 1784-87 (2002).
99. See Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Allen Ferrell, A New Approach to Takeover Law and
Regulatory Competition, 87 VA. L. REV. 111, 137 (2001) ("It might be that Dela-
ware firms are different from other firms in some respects and the difference in
Tobin's Q might reflect these differences rather than increased value attributable
to Delaware law.").
100. See Subramanian, supra note 98, at 57.
101. See John C. Coffee, Jr., The Rise of Dispersed Ownership: The Roles of Law and
the State in the Separation of Ownership and Control, 111 YALE L.J. 1, 66 (2001)
(stating that a strong legal framework is necessary for a securities market to
function optimally).
102. See infra Part IV.F (discussing the uniformity of state corporate law).
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may not show that the corporate law of a particular state has created
a difference in value might be that the market has not fully im-
pounded corporate law into the price of securities.1 0 3 This reason
would support a proposal for a the mandatory disclosure of state cor-
porate law-better dissemination of information about state corporate
law would increase the likelihood that it is fully incorporated into se-
curities prices.1 o4
There is also empirical evidence that state law is important to in-
corporation choices.1o 5 While these studies do not necessarily mea-
sure the value of a particular state's corporate law, they do
demonstrate the importance of state corporate law to investors. For
example, Professor Marcel Kahan states:
We find substantial evidence that firms are more likely to incorporate in
states with a corporate law that offers firms flexibility in areas unrelated to
takeovers and significant though less robust evidence that firms are more
likely to incorporate in states with a higher quality judicial system .... Firms
value flexibility and a high-quality judicial system in setting up their govern-
ance arrangements and are more likely to incorporate in their head-quarter
state if it has a legal regime that offers these features.
1 0 6
In other words, state corporate law is important to the governance
of public firms and is important to investors in those firms. Indeed,
information about state corporate law is important to investors no
matter whether a firm chooses to incorporate in a state because its
corporate law favors managers or because it increases value for
shareholders. 107
F. Preliminary conclusion
This section has demonstrated that information on state corporate
law is an integral piece of the overall mix of information investors
need to evaluate the risk of management expropriation in public com-
panies. Any argument against the mandatory disclosure of corporate
law solely because it is irrelevant to the investors of public companies
is untenable.
Arguments that directly attack state corporate law as trivial or ir-
relevant are not directed at the relevance of state corporate law for
disclosure purposes. However valid these arguments may be for their
intended purposes, they fail as arguments against mandatory disclo-
103. See infra Part IV.G (discussing market incorporation of state corporate law into
the price of securities).
104. See id.
105. See, e.g., Marcel Kahan, The Demand for Corporate Law: Statutory Flexibility,
Judicial Quality or Takeover Protection?, 22 J.L. EcoN. & ORG. 340 (2006);
Bebchuk & Cohen, supra note 4; Daines, supra note 85.
106. Kahan, supra note 105, at 363.
107. See id. at 340 (discussing the debate on whether firms incorporate in a state be-
cause the law favors managers or increases firm value).
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sure of state corporate law because they implicitly concede that inves-
tors are interested in information on state corporate law.
This section has also demonstrated the weakness of any argument
against the mandatory disclosure of state corporate law on the
grounds that public companies would disclose it voluntarily if it were
truly relevant to investors. In fact, mandatory disclosure is necessary
because it is unlikely that public companies would otherwise disclose
this information even when investors preferred such disclosures.
This section has also demonstrated that any argument against the
mandatory disclosure of state corporate law because it is already indi-
rectly disclosed through the mandatory disclosure of firm-level rules
also ultimately fails. Many important aspects of state corporate law
will not be reflected in firm-level rules.
Finally, this section has demonstrated that empirical evidence gen-
erally supports the proposition that corporate law affects the value of
firms, even though there is no consensus on the more specific question
of whether Delaware corporate law adds value to public companies.
IV. THE BENEFITS OF MANDATORY DISCLOSURE
OF STATE CORPORATE LAW
If it is assumed, for the sake of argument, that the preceding sec-
tion successfully argued that information about state corporate law
was important to investors in public companies, there still may be ob-
jections to a rule requiring public companies to disclose such informa-
tion. One might argue that requiring issuers to disclose information
on state corporate law forces the issuer to incur unnecessary costs
since the information is already publicly available. The remainder of
this section discusses this argument.
A. The efficient capital market hypothesis ("ECMH")
The efficient capital market hypothesis ("ECMH") is a fascinating
theory on how capital markets incorporate public and non-public in-
formation into the price of securities.108 It has been a popular topic in
economic, financial, and legal scholarship.1o 9
108. "What makes the ECMH non-trivial, of course, is its prediction that, even though
information is not immediately and costlessly available to all participants, the
market will act as if it were." Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier H. Kraakman, The
Mechanisms of Market Efficiency, 70 VA. L. REv. 549, 552 (1984). For a well-
presented and relatively detailed summary of the ECMH, see KLEIN & COFFEE,
supra note 76, at 417-25.
109. See Lynn A. Stout, The Mechanisms of Market Inefficiency: An Introduction to the
New Finance, 28 J. CORP. L. 635, 636 (2003) (stating the efficient market hypoth-
esis had "captured the imagination of a generation of economists and finance the-
orists" and "[s]oon after it captured the imaginations of legal scholars and
lawmakers as well").
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The earliest scholarship on the ECMH focused on how the availa-
bility of information-from publicly-available information to private
information-affected arbitrage opportunities for those who had ac-
cess to the information. 1 10 In other words, if one has access to certain
information that is relevant to the price of the securities of a certain
publicly-traded company, can one use that information to make a
profit from buying or selling the company's securities?1 1 1 If the mar-
ket processed the information and impounded it into the price of the
securities before an investor had a chance to trade on the information,
the investor could not profit from the information. Whether the mar-
ket quickly and efficiently incorporates the information in question
may depend on how available the information is to other traders.
If the only information an investor had was the historical perform-
ance of the price of the security, would the investor be able to engage
in lucrative arbitrage opportunities? The weak form of the ECMH
posits that investors cannot beat the market simply by examining how
the price of the security has fluctuated in the past. 11 2 There is no
advantage over the other traders in the market because the informa-
tion is readily available and is relatively easy to process. Further-
more, it is also unlikely that the information is material to the future
performance of the security. Empirical studies have provided support
for the weak form of the ECMH.113
The semi-strong form of the ECMH addresses whether an investor
has an advantage over other traders in the market when he has pub-
licly-available information (other than information on the historical
performance of the security).1 14 One might think that if anyone had
actually read and processed this information, that person could take
advantage of other traders in the market who did not know of the in-
formation or who had not actually processed the information. How-
ever, the semi-strong form of the ECMH posits that an investor could
not gain such an advantage. 1 15 In fact, the main point of the ECMH is
that if the information were widely available, the market price would
reflect the information.116 Because the price any trader is willing to
pay or accept is based on the market price, if the market has already
110. See Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 108, at 554-56 (describing Eugene Fama's
"landmark 1970 review article").
111. See id.
112. See Eugene F. Fama, Efficient Capital Markets: A Review of Theory and Empiri-
cal Work, 25 J. FIN. 383, 389-96 (1970).
113. See Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 108, at 555 n.25 (describing the empirical
literature).
114. See Fama, supra note 112, at 383, 404-09.
115. See KLEIN & COFFEE, supra note 76, at 417 ("[Plursuit of undervalued stocks in a
deep, liquid securities market is likely to be fruitless, because securities prices
reflect all publicly available information . . ").
116. See Stout, supra note 109, at 640 ("One of the most salient implications of this
view of market efficiency ... is that in an efficient market, traders cannot profit
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impounded the information into the price of the security, even the
trader who has no knowledge of the public information in question will
receive a price (or pay a price) that reflects the information.
Finally, the strong form of the ECMH addresses whether an inves-
tor can gain an advantage over the market when he is one of only a
few traders who have access to the information.11V If the market effi-
ciently incorporates this kind of private information into the price of
the stock, then the investor would not profit by trading on it.
B. The ECMH and the disclosure of state corporate law
The ECMH has normative implications for the information public
companies are required to disclose.1 1 8 The semi-strong form of the
ECMH-which states that publicly available information is already
incorporated into the price of securities-might suggest that compa-
nies need not be required to disclose material aspects of state corpo-
rate law since it is already publicly available through a variety of
sources.119
Indeed, the statutory corporate law of any U.S. jurisdiction is read-
ily available on the internet. State court decisions creating common
law corporate governance rules and interpreting the statutory corpo-
rate law are widely available either on the internet or in the law li-
braries of public institutions. Furthermore, the organizational
documents (e.g., the articles of incorporation, the bylaws, etc.) of pub-
lic companies are widely available through a combination of state fil-
ings, federal disclosure rules, and state laws providing shareholders
with access to certain corporate records.
If state law is indeed publicly available, then information about
state corporate law should already be incorporated into the price of
securities. One could argue, based on this logic, that requiring compa-
nies to assemble and disclose such information would impose unneces-
sary costs on public companies.
I am not convinced, however, that the semi-strong form of the
ECMH instructs us that there is no need to require public companies
to disclose state corporate law. First, even assuming the ECMH is
true, it does not work by magic. Information is not incorporated into
from trading on publicly available information in a way that allows them to 'beat
the market.'").
117. See Fama, supra note 112, at 409-13.
118. See Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 108, at 549-50 (stating that the ECMH has
influenced the SEC's revision of the disclosure system).
119. See Romano, supra note 6, at 2366 ("It is plausible to assume that investors are
informed about [state corporate law] liability rules given the sophistication of the
institutional investors who comprise a majority of stock market investors and
whose actions determine market prices on which uniformed investors can rely.").
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the price of securities without costs. 12 0 In fact, the three different
types of information discussed under the weak, semi-strong, and
strong forms of the ECMH are merely proxies for information costs-
namely the costs of gathering, processing, and validating
information.12 1
The information costs for the historical performance of a company's
securities, as discussed under the weak-form ECMH, are relatively
low. In contrast, the costs for other publicly available information, as
discussed under the semi-strong form ECMH, may be higher depend-
ing on where the information is available (as well as the cost of gather-
ing the information and verifying it) and how much processing of the
information is required. Finally, private information, as discussed
under the strong-form ECMH, by its nature is costly to acquire.
Thus, as a general matter, the ECMH, if true, simply tells us that
the lower the costs of the information, the more likely that the infor-
mation will be incorporated into the price of the securities. 12 2 Profes-
sors Gilson and Kraakman, in their influential article, The
Mechanisms of Market Efficiency, suggest that the more efficient the
market for information is, the more efficient the capital market will
be. 123 If such is the case, then rather than instructing that a particu-
lar kind of information ought not be required to be disclosed, the
ECMH instructs that there should be careful consideration of whether
utilizing disclosure rules would reduce the costs of information and
thus improve the efficiency of the market for information. 12 4 This
pragmatic approach to the understanding of efficient markets is espe-
cially valid if market mechanisms may not incorporate information as
well as some interpretations of ECMH suggest.12 5
C. The information costs of state corporate law
Does ECMH and the general availability of information on state
corporate law make it unnecessary to use the mandatory disclosure
120. See Stout, supra note 109, at 652-55 (discussing the theory that "market prices
behave as if all investors know the information" because of the trading activity of
arbitrageurs, but noting that "arbitrage is not a costless process").
121. See Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 108, at 597, 611.
122. See KLEIN & COFFEE, supra note 76, at 421 (presenting the argument that "the
cheaper the information is to acquire, the more efficient will be the market").
123. See Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 108, at 597, 611.
124. See KLEIN & COFFEE, supra note 76, at 421 (presenting the "perspective" that
securities laws are a "strategy for the collectivization and broad dissemination of
securities information, in order thereby both to reduce the cost of information
acquisition and to increase the speed of its dissemination").
125. "[T]he market mechanism described by Gilson and Kraakman is anything but a
clean,elegant, well-designed machine. Rather, it is a Rube Goldberg apparatus: a
jury-rigged contraption full of frail components, weak links, and moving parts,
rife with potential for failure." Stout, supra note 109, at 638.
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system to reduce information costs? To answer this question, it must
be recognized that although information on state corporate law is
available to the general public, it is not costless. First, there is the
cost of acquiring the information.12 6 Although statutory law is readily
available on the internet and in law libraries, finding court decisions
interpreting statutes and establishing common law rules requires a
more significant investment, 12 7 and it is in court decisions where
many important substantive rules of corporate law are found.128
Furthermore, once the investor has found the law and sorted out
the most important of its rules and standards, she will bear the costs
of processing the information.12 9 The most substantial of these
processing costs is the investment in knowledge that allows the inves-
tor to understand the significance of the information.
Finally, the investor bears the cost of validating the informa-
tion.13o When one is receiving state corporate law information from
primary legal sources, then validating the information is part of the
cost of gathering the information-accuracy and timeliness are part of
the legal research process. When one is acquiring the information
through secondary legal sources, the costs of validating the accuracy
and timeliness of the information are separate and distinct from the
costs of gathering the information.
D. Reducing information costs for investors through
mandatory disclosure
When we do not require the issuer to bear the costs of compiling
information and providing it to the market, individual traders will be
required to bear these costs. In a hypothetical market of 10,000 trad-
ers, for example, the market will bear the costs of acquiring the infor-
mation 10,000 separate times.1 3 1
If, on the other hand, the burden is placed on the issuer to acquire
the information, overall costs are reduced because only the issuer will
126. See Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 108, at 597, 611.
127. The time to actually do the research; the time and money spent in learning how
to do legal research; and the time and money invested in an education in corpo-
rate governance that will allow one to sift through statutes and court opinions to
glean the rules that are important should all be considered.
128. See Kahan & Kamar, supra note 86, at 707 ("It is judge-made law, rather than
statutory law, that governs such fundamental issues as the fiduciary duties of
directors, officers, and controlling shareholders in self-dealing transactions, the
scope of corporate opportunities, the obligations of directors in dealing with con-
trol challenges, the prerequisites for a derivative suit, directors' disclosure obliga-
tions, and the scope of impermissible corporate waste.").
129. See Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 108, at 597, 611.
130. See id.
131. Of course, they can reduce these costs by collectivizing their efforts. See infra
Part IV.I.
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make the investment in acquiring the information. Thus, by requiring
public companies to disclose information about state corporate law,
"the repetitive cost of individual acquisition of information by each an-
alyst"132 is eliminated, and information costs for the market are
reduced.
A mandatory disclosure regime will also reduce the costs of verify-
ing the accuracy of the information. Civil and criminal laws penaliz-
ing those who provide inaccurate information reduce the risk that
companies will disclose intentionally inaccurate information.13 3 In
addition, because other companies incorporated in the same jurisdic-
tion should disclose the same information, companies will have an in-
centive to be careful and diligent about the accuracy of their own
disclosures. The market can easily verify information disclosed by one
company by reading the disclosures of other companies incorporated
in the same jurisdiction. Of course, companies will always have an
incentive to produce the minimum amount of information or present it
in the most favorable light,' 3 4 but absent collusion, they will be wary
of being embarrassed by another issuer's more accurate and careful
disclosure of the law. In addition, inaccurate information will gener-
ate law review articles, blogging by corporate law professors, and re-
ports in the financial press, further facilitating the market's
validation of the information.
Admittedly, mandatory disclosure of state corporate law will have
less of a beneficial effect on reducing the costs of processing the infor-
mation. Even with a rule requiring companies to disclose information
on state corporate law, investors will still need to invest in the knowl-
edge and time required to make qualitative judgments about the infor-
mation. That is not to say that mandatory disclosure could have no
effect on the costs of processing the information. A well-crafted disclo-
sure rule would require the company to organize the information on
state corporate law and present it in context-i.e., in the context of its
current practices and firm-level rules as well as any exchange rules
that may apply. In some sense, it would require the company to par-
tially digest some of the information for the market in a way similar to
132. See Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 108, at 601 (commenting generally on how
"legislation such as the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, which requires contin-
ual disclosure of extensive current information by public companies" contributes
to the reduction of information costs).
133. See id. at 605 (stating that civil and criminal penalties are a "potentially less
expensive" solution to the problem of verification costs). Of course, the threat of
penalty will likely encourage issuers to disclose as little information as possible.
134. See id. at 602 ("[T]he information's producer will often stand to benefit by leading
the recipient to overvalue the product . . ").
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what is already required in the management's discussion and analy-
sis 13 5 and the compensation discussion and analysis.136
E. Information costs for the company
As stated above, the mandatory disclosure of state corporate law
would not eliminate information costs, but would merely shift them
from the investors to the public company. This approach is only an
efficient solution when the company has a comparative advantage in
the information.13 7 In other words, investors would only prefer a rule
requiring public companies to disclose information on state corporate
law when the issuer can address the information costs more efficiently
than the investors (comparatively). After all, it is the investors who
will eventually bear any information costs imposed on the
company. 138
It seems likely that public companies have a comparative advan-
tage in information about state corporate law. First, the information
costs to the company are almost certainly lower than the costs to in-
vestor population as a whole. As explained above, if the information
costs are placed on investors, then numerous investors, not just one,
will each bear the same costs of investing in the same information.139
Placing the burden on the company instead of the investors, then,
reduces duplicative efforts in the market, but it does not completely
eliminate them. Public companies will also engage in duplicative ef-
forts in producing information on state corporate law. An issuer incor-
porated in State A, for example, should be producing the same
information on state corporate law as the other issuers incorporated in
State A. Thus, whether issuers or investors should bear the informa-
tion costs seems to boil down to which group's duplicative efforts are
less costly.
It seems that the duplicative efforts of issuers are less costly for
two reasons. First, there are fewer issuers than investors in the mar-
ket. The duplicative costs of (fewer) issuers would be lower than the
duplicative costs of (more) investors. Second, even without a
mandatory disclosure rule, most issuers would invest in gathering,
processing, and validating a substantial amount of information about
state corporate law for internal uses. After all, corporate governance
is necessarily a major part of the "business" of any public company.
135. 17 C.F.R. § 229.303 (2007) (Management's discussion and analysis of financial
condition and results of operations).
136. 17 C.F.R. § 229.402(b) (2007).
137. See Kitch, supra note 70, at 775. Professor Kitch has suggested that this should
be limited to "value-relevant information about the issuers own business." Id.
138. See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 7, at 696 (stating that the costs of disclo-
sure are "borne in large part by investors").
139. See supra Part IV.D.
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Thus, it is to be expected that most, if not all, public companies would
invest in informing its directors and executive officers about (1) their
duties, rights, and protections under state corporate law and (2)
whether and how those duties, rights and protections were modified
by firm-level rules.140 Therefore, a mandatory disclosure rule would
only create additional costs for companies if the rule required disclo-
sure of information that deviated significantly from the information
the company already collected.
F. The implications of substantial uniformity of state
corporate laws on information costs
Of course, one of the assumptions justifying the argument that the
costs of state corporate law information are relatively high for inves-
tors is that investors need to research fifty-one different corporate
laws. 141 If the corporate laws of all the states were uniform, however,
there would be little or no justification for mandatory disclosure of
state corporate law. The information costs for investors under a uni-
form law would be reduced significantly because investors would only
need to gather, process, and validate information on one uniform cor-
porate law that would apply to all U.S. public companies.
There is not formal uniformity of state corporate law in the U.S.
However, there is strong support for the proposition that there is sub-
stantial uniformity.142 For example, both Professor Bernard Black
and Professor Roberta Romano predicted substantial uniformity in
state corporate law in separate articles written nearly two decades
ago. 14 3 In an empirical study published in 1998, Professor William
Carney found that "American corporate law reveal[ed] a pattern of
substantial uniformity."144 In a more recent article, Professor J. Rob-
ert Brown argued that although the corporate laws of the various U.S.
states do diverge in certain aspects, they are largely consistent with
Delaware's approach.14 5 Further support for the idea that there is
substantial uniformity in state corporate law comes from the litera-
ture on comparative corporate governance. When scholars compare
140. Even if not all of the companies are engaging in this type of activity, we would
still expect that a significant majority of public companies would.
141. See supra notes 4-5 and accompanying text (stating that nearly all U.S. states
are the state of incorporation for at least one public company).
142. See John C. Coffee, Jr., The Future As History: The Prospects for Global Conver-
gence in Corporate Governance and Its Implications, 93 Nw. U. L. REV. 641, 702
(1999) (stating that empirical literature shows a "high degree of uniformity" in
U.S. corporate laws).
143. See Black, supra note 37, at 586; Roberta Romano, The State Competition Debate
in Corporate Law, 8 CARDozo L. REV. 709, 718 (1987).
144. William J. Carney, The Production of Corporate Law, 71 S. CAL. L. REV. 715, 755
(1998).
145. See Brown, supra note 49, at 334.
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the corporate governance of various nations, they consider the U.S. as
a single jurisdiction, and do not make distinctions between the laws of
the various U.S. states.146
I do not necessarily disagree with the claims of substantial uni-
formity in state corporate laws, but I do caution against using sub-
stantial uniformity as an argument against mandatory disclosure of
state corporate law. Professor Romano recognized that even with sub-
stantial uniformity, there would be periods of divergence as innova-
tions disperse from state to state.14 7 Similarly, Professor Carney
tempered his observation of substantial uniformity by noting that the
"pattern [of uniformity] is less than complete because of a constant
process of innovation driven by interest groups."148
In fact, in addition to the spread of successful innovations that
both Professors Romano and Carney expressly acknowledged, we can
imagine there will also be unsuccessful innovations, the dispersion of
which will be eventually halted by market rejection, but not before
some states had already adopted the innovation. Thus, even when
there is substantial uniformity there will be periods of time where
there are major differences in state corporate laws because either
"good" innovations have not spread to all states or because "bad" inno-
vations have not yet been repealed in the states that have adopted
them.149 Mandatory disclosure would reduce information costs that
arise because of these constant and inevitable divergences.
As one example of these divergences, in 1998, when Professor Car-
ney published his paper, one would find that thirty-one of the fifty
states, or sixty-two percent, had a statute that provided for dissenters
rights as an exclusive remedy.150 This number provides sufficient
support for an argument of substantial uniformity, but only because
the relevant time line is so long. The first state to adopt a statute did
so in 1959,151 and the last one to adopt it did so in 1994.152 A further
breakdown reveals that of the thirty-one states with this statutory
provision in their corporate codes, two states adopted it prior to
146. See La Porta et al, supra note 36. See also James A. Fanto, The Absence of Cross-
Cultural Communication: SEC Mandatory Disclosure and Foreign Corporate
Governance, 17 Nw. J. INT'L. L. & Bus. 119 (1996) (examining whether foreign
issuers should be required to disclose more information about the corporate gov-
ernance systems of their home countries because of the possible differences be-
tween their corporate governance systems and the U.S. corporate governance
system).
147. See Romano, supra note 143, at 718.
148. See Carney, supra note 144, at 755 (emphasis added).
149. See id. at 740 (noting "a strong tendency toward uniformity over time") (emphasis
added).
150. See id. at 743-44 (Table 2).
151. The first state was Connecticut. See id. at 743 (Table 2).
152. Arizona was the last state. See id. at 743 (Table 2).
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1966,153 two states adopted it between 1966 and 1975,154 ten states
adopted it between 1976 and 1985,155 and seventeen states adopted it
between 1986 and 1994.156 This breakdown demonstrates substantial
divergence in corporate law in numerous shorter time periods within
the longer time line of 1959 to 1995. This pattern does not contradict
Professor Carney's conclusion that there is substantial uniformity in
state corporate law today, but it supports my argument that even with
substantial uniformity, mandatory disclosure of corporate law can re-
duce information costs of inevitable and substantial divergences.
Of course, one could argue that although states have not achieved
actual uniformity, the capital market has achieved functional uni-
formity. Approximately fifty-eight percent of public firms incorporate
in Delaware, and the percentage seems to be increasing.15 7 Once
again, however, I would caution against using functional uniformity
as a justification for not requiring issuers to make disclosures about
the corporate law of their respective states of incorporation. One of
the reasons Delaware has captured such a large percentage of the
market for incorporations may be due to lower information costs about
Delaware corporate law because of the vast attention it receives in
scholarship and the financial media.15 8 Thus, although Delaware's
large market share of incorporations arguably creates a functional
uniformity of state corporate law, this functional uniformity may be
caused, at least in part, by the current absence of a rule mandating
public companies disclose state corporate law. Mandatory disclosure
of state corporate law for all public companies will reduce costs of in-
formation for the corporate laws of every state and possibly remove
one of Delaware's advantages.
153. Connecticut adopted its law in 1959, and New York did so in 1961. See id. at
743-44 (Table 2).
154. California adopted its statute in 1975. Texas adopted its statute in 1967. See id.
at 743 (Table 2).
155. These states include: Colorado, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Minnesota, Nebraska,
New Hampshire, New Mexico, North Dakota, and Virginia. See id. at 743-44
(Table 2).
156. These states include: Arizona, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Iowa, Kentucky, Mich-
igan, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nevada, North Carolina, Oregon, Tennes-
see, Washington, Wisconsin, and Wyoming. See id. at 743-44 (Table 2).
157. See Bebchuk & Cohen, supra note 4, at 389 ("Delaware has by far the largest
stake of incorporations: 58 percent of all firms, 59 percent of Fortune 500 firms,
and an even higher percentage-68 percent-of all firms that went public in the
period 1996-2000.").
158. As I argue in Part IV.I, infra:
With a wide variety of public companies incorporated in Delaware, trad-
ers can use their information on Delaware corporate law for more than
one company without jeopardizing diversification. In addition, in-
termediaries who collect information for investors can do so at a lower
cost because the attention academics and the media pay to Delaware law
makes information available at a lower cost.
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G. Reducing the costs of unincorporated information
To this point, this Article has suggested that mandatory disclosure
of state corporate law would promote a more efficient capital market
because it would help ensure information on state corporate law would
be incorporated into the prices of securities at a lower cost.
Mandatory disclosure of state corporate law also would promote a
more efficient capital market by ensuring that information on state
corporate law is incorporated into the price of securities when there is
a likelihood that some important aspects of it would not be incorpo-
rated at all without mandatory disclosure.
When information is costly, there is a possibility that the market
will not invest in that information at all, which results in market
prices of securities that do not reflect the information.159 Without a
rule mandating disclosure of such information, the market would bear
the costs of inaccurate prices. 160
It is a fairly uncontroversial proposition that the better the dissem-
ination of the information, the more efficiently it will be incorporated
into the market price. 16 1 For prices to fully reflect a certain piece of
information, there must be a certain volume of informed trading,
which requires a certain number of informed investors.162 Because it
is uncertain when this critical mass of informed trading has been
reached, conditions must be created that are conducive to it. To that
end, it would be reasonable to posit that the greater disincentives
traders have to invest in and trade on certain information, the greater
the chance that the information will not be incorporated into the mar-
ket. With respect to information on certain aspects of state corporate
law, there is a strong argument that there are substantial disincen-
tives for traders to invest in such information because it is costly and
because they may not recoup those costs by trading on the
information.16 3
State corporate law information is arguably quite costly-not in
absolute terms, but in relative terms. There are numerous factors and
159. See Stout, supra note 109, at 656 (stating that even if information is public it may
never be incorporated in securities prices).
160. See supra notes 19-21 and accompanying text (providing a summary of the im-
portance of accurate share pricing).
161. See Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 108, at 593 ("The lower the cost of particular
information, the wider will be its distribution, the more effective will be the capi-
tal market mechanism operating to reflect it in prices, and the more efficient will
be the market with respect to it.").
162. See id. at 568 ("rapid price equilibration does not require widespread dissemina-
tion of information, but only a minority of knowledgeable traders who control a
critical volume of trading activity").
163. See id. at 571 ("Since informed trading is costly, market professionals must enjoy
some informational advantage that permits them to earn a commensurate
return.").
[Vol. 86:795
STATE CORPORATE LAW DISCLOSURES
variables that influence the value of a company's securities, and a ra-
tional trader with limited resources will have to make decisions about
where to invest her resources.1 64 She will invest her resources in in-
formation that will provide her the greatest potential return. For
every dollar she invests, she expects at least one dollar in return.
Since her rationality is bounded, she will most likely focus her efforts
on the "big ticket" issues-such as product markets, labor markets,
and economic indicators. If she did focus on state corporate law, she
would limit her focus on the few issues that have the most pronounced
affect on the price of securities-such as anti-takeover statutes.16 5
This strategy gives her the best chance to receive a positive return on
her investment in information.
If this is the investor's strategy-and I believe it is the most plausi-
ble strategy-she will not pay much attention, if any, to the influence
of most of state corporate law on corporate governance unless it is pro-
vided to her. Indeed there is a possibility that for every dollar she
invests in gathering this knowledge, she will receive less than a dollar
return, or at least this might be her perception when she is allocating
resources to do research. Even if her one-dollar investment in state
corporate law information resulted in a positive return, the trader
would be better off investing that dollar gathering information that
would provide a greater return. Thus, traders have a disincentive to
invest in gathering and validating information on state corporate law
because it is relatively too costly.
There is also an argument that an efficient capital market itself
further exacerbates the relatively high cost of state corporate law in-
formation by creating free-rider costs that reduce the potential for re-
turn on the investment in information. The ECMH implicitly tells us
uninformed investors free-ride on the efforts of informed investors, at
least to a certain extent.166 Informed investors acquire, gather, and
process the information. They then trade on that information. Their
trading activity causes the information to be incorporated into the
price of the stock. Uniformed traders benefit by the trading activity of
informed investors because they trade based on the market price of
164. See Stout, supra note 109, at 655 ("[Arbitrageurs, like the rest of us, enjoy access
to only finite amounts of money . ").
165. See Daines, supra note 85, at 1560 ("These findings are consistent with the theory
that... Delaware [corporate law] better facilitates takeovers, thereby improving
shareholder value."); Lucian Bebchuck, Alma Cohen, and Allen Ferrell, What
Matters in Corporate Governance (2005) (working paper available at http://pa-
pers.ssrn.com/abstract id=593423) (finding a negative correlation between firm
value and certain anti-takeover, or "entrenching" provisions in organizational
documents).
166. See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 7, at 694 (stating that "uninformed traders
can take a free ride").
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the security, which already reflects the information gathered,
processed, and verified by informed investors.
This type of "spillover" (or "positive externality") is only problem-
atic if it creates a disincentive for the informed traders to invest in
informing themselves. If the informed investors cannot use their in-
formation to gain an advantage in the market, then they have a disin-
centive to invest in that information.167 Thus, the more efficient the
capital market is in incorporating information into the price of securi-
ties, the less incentive traders have to bear the information costs.
168
There is an argument that, as a general proposition, there is just
enough inefficiency in the market to encourage traders to invest in
information.169 In addition, there might be sufficient opportunity for
a trader to engage in arbitrage with respect to the influence of infor-
mation on the fundamental value of the security. The idea is that
even assuming the market is so efficient that it immediately incorpo-
rates any information into securities prices ("informational effi-
ciency"),170 it still may not be as efficient in incorporating the correct
value of that information into the price ("fundamental value effi-
ciency").17 1 Put another way, the market may incorporate the infor-
mation immediately, but it may not incorporate it correctly. 1 72 Thus,
even though the trader may not have an incentive to bear the informa-
tion costs of state corporate law because she will not be able to beat
167. See Kitch, supra note 70, at 774-75 ("[Tlhere will tend to be both underinvest-
ment and overinvestment in the activity of predicting the accurate price. There
will be underinvestment because no actor is able to capture the full benefits of
being accurate."); Stout, supra note 109, at 640 n.24 (stating that it cannot be
true that traders can never beat the market or "no one would have incentive to
trade on information in a way that leads to the incorporation of that information
into prices").
168. See KLEIN & COFFEE, supra note 76, at 420 (explaining the paradox as, "if the
return on investment in information is low, one cannot reasonably expect the
search activities to continue that keep the market efficient").
169. See generally Sanford J. Grossman & Joseph E. Stiglitz, On the Impossibility of
Informationally Efficient Markets, 70 Am. ECON. REV. 393 (1980).
170. See Stout, supra note 109, at 640 ("The concept of informational efficiency accord-
ingly can be understood as a prediction or implication about the speed with which
prices respond to information."). Other scholars have referred to informational
efficiency as "speculative efficiency." See KLEIN & COFFEE, supra note 76, at 421.
171. See Stout, supra note 109, at 640 ("Markets are efficient in the fundamental
value sense if stock prices respond to available information not only quickly but
accurately, so that market prices mirror the best possible estimates, in light of all
available information, of the actual economic values of securities in terms of their
expected risks and returns."). Other scholars have referred to fundamental value
efficiency as "allocative efficiency." See KLEIN & COFFEE, supra note 76, at 421.
172. See Stout, supra note 109, at 651 (arguing that when "finance economists define
market efficiency in terms of the difficulty of making arbitrage profits" they have
implicitly accepted the idea that "a market can be informationally efficient with-
out also being fundamental value efficient").
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the market in time, she may have an incentive to invest in the infor-
mation in order to beat the market in valuing the information.
Of course, if a trader understands the correct value of the informa-
tion better than the market, she has only won half the battle. She
must now also convince the market that her interpretation of the in-
formation is correct-otherwise, the price will never reflect her
view.173 Thus, a trader who wants to beat the market on fundamental
value must not only invest a great amount of resources in processing,
gathering, and verifying the information, she might also need to in-
vest money in convincing the market that her assessment of the fun-
damental value is correct. 174 She might be willing to bear these costs,
but she will do so only when the chance for a return is greater, provid-
ing her a better chance for her to recoup these costs. Thus, she has a
greater incentive to invest in the type of material information that will
create the biggest movement in the stock price-such as product mar-
kets, takeover markets, economic indicators, etc. She has little or no
incentive to invest in information, like certain aspects of state corpo-
rate law, that alone cause little or no movement in stock prices.
Thus, there is a strong argument that if public companies are not
required to bear the costs of disclosure of state corporate law, then the
market has little or no incentive to invest in acquiring, verifying, and
processing the aspects of state corporate law which create less obvious
movements in stock prices. In which case, it will be unlikely for these
aspects of state corporate law to be impounded into the price of the
securities.
H. "Piecemeal incorporation" of state corporate law
information
One of the problems with discussing how the market incorporates
state corporate law into the price of securities is that most of our un-
derstanding of efficient markets seems to assume that information oc-
curs in "events." In other words, most previous scholarship has either
expressly focused on, or implicitly assumed, the sudden occurrence of
some important event when examining how the market incorporates
information into the price of securities. 175
Unfortunately, state corporate law does not fit neatly into that
mold. State corporate law itself is not an "event." It has been around
173. See Coffee, supra note 15, at 725-26 (quoting the Wall Street Trader's credo, "A
bargain that remains a bargain is no bargain").
174. See Stout, supra note 109, at 655 (stating that arbitrageurs "face the risk that
uniformed investors will stay uninformed").
175. See id. at 652 (describing "the great enthusiasm legal scholars and economists
have shown in recent years for 'event studies' that attempt to assess investors'
views of the merits of changes in corporate law or policy by gauging whether,
when the event is announced, share prices rise or fall").
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since the existence of modern capital markets. Of course, there have
been revisions, amendments, modifications, and interpretations of
state corporate laws over the years that can properly be considered
"events."176 The question, then, is whether state corporate law is im-
pounded piecemeal into market price as a series of events or whether
it is something more organic that sits there and evolves, but remains
largely unnoticed in the market price of a security.
The argument that the market has slowly incorporated the price of
state corporate law into securities is plausible,177 but not necessarily
true. Essentially, the argument for piecemeal incorporation of state
corporate law assumes that state corporate law information is "'old'
information imbedded in securities prices,"178 which is later updated
and incorporated into the price of securities by well-publicized events.
However, it is debatable whether state corporate law was ever incor-
porated into the price of securities in the past. Incorporation of state
corporate law in the past would suffer from the same problems al-
ready discussed-namely, that investors have a disincentive to bear
the information costs of state corporate law.179 It may be that time
and media attention to major changes in state corporate law have
somewhat mitigated the effects of the disincentives, but by no means
have time and media attention ensured that the market has fully im-
pounded state corporate law into securities prices.
In addition, even assuming for the sake of argument, that state
corporate law was incorporated into the prices of securities sometime
in the past (at the initial public offering stage, for example), for the
current prices to reflect that information, we would have to believe
that the market never forgets. However, it is quite plausible that this
information gets lost in the market over the years as the prices of the
securities fluctuate in response to other information. Mandatory, reg-
ular disclosure of this information would ensure that the market price
continuously reflects information on state corporate law.
176. For an example of an event study trying to measure investors' reactions to a
change in state corporate law, see Michael Bradley & Cindy A. Schipani, The
Relevance of the Duty of Care Standard in Corporate Governance, 75 IowA L. REV.
1 (1989) (trying to measure the market response to a Delaware Supreme Court
decision on the duty of care and a change to Delaware General Corporation Law
allowing a charter provision exculpating directors for violations of the duty of
care).
177. See Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 108, at 562 (describing how the trader's ac-
quisition of new information "increases his total store of information, but it may
also alter some or all of the information he already holds").
178. See id. at 568 (discussing how " 'Iolld' information imbedded in securities is the
closest approximation to universal dissemination of information").
179. See supra Part IV.G.
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I. Market solutions
Besides state corporate law, there is likely a whole variety of mate-
rial information that is never incorporated into the price of the securi-
ties because the information costs are too high. The key to getting this
information into the market price, if we consider it important enough,
is to reduce the costs of the information. Although mandatory disclo-
sure can reduce these information costs, we must remember that the
there are also market solutions to reducing the information costs. 18 0
Investors could collectivize their efforts in order to reduce informa-
tion costs. For example, let us say that the cost of a certain piece of
information is one dollar, but it will only result in a $0.10 difference in
value for the investor who invests in 10,000 shares of Company A. If
more than ten investors equally share the one-dollar cost of the infor-
mation, then their investment in the information will be worthwhile.
The market would see the emergence of market intermediaries that
gather, process, and verify state corporate law information at a price if
it were worthwhile for these third parties to do so.1 8 1
Alternatively, an individual investor could reduce the relative cost
of the information if she invested in Company A and ten other public
companies to which the information was relevant. When the informa-
tion is the corporate law of a particular state, the investor can reduce
her costs when she can invest in several companies that are incorpo-
rated in the same state.
In a similar fashion, public companies can engage in conduct that
reduces state corporate law information costs for the investors. Com-
pany A, for example, could incorporate in a jurisdiction that is the
state of incorporation for many other public companies and, thus, al-
low investors to invest in many companies for which the information
would be relevant.i8 2 This analysis suggests that one of the reasons
Delaware is the state of incorporation for the majority of U.S. public
companies 8 3 may be the lower information costs with respect to Dela-
ware corporate law.' 8 4 With a wide variety of public companies incor-
180. See KLEIN & COFFEE, supra note 76, at 420 ("Many familiar market institutions,
such as the investment banking firm, can be understood as market mechanisms
for reducing information costs.").
181. See Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 108, at 600 ("We then see market efforts to
economize on acquisition costs through collectivization at both private and public
levels .... Indeed, the very existence of information intermediaries ... reflects,
in part, the potential for economies of scale and scope in efforts to economize on
information costs.") (citations omitted).
182. They may prefer to do this rather than voluntarily disclose information about
state corporate law for the reasons discussed above. See supra Part III.B.
183. See supra note 4.
184. See Bebchuk & Cohen, supra note 4, at 385 (discussing how incorporating in
might have positive effects that are due to "network benefits" and are unrelated
to the quality of Delaware corporate law).
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porated in Delaware, traders can use their information on Delaware
corporate law for more than one company without jeopardizing diver-
sification. In addition, intermediaries who collect information for in-
vestors can do so at a lower cost because the attention academics and
the media pay to Delaware law makes information available at a
lower cost.' 8 5
However, the existence of potential market solutions to reduce in-
formation costs does not necessarily negate the need for, or the benefit
of, mandatory disclosure of state corporate law. The emergence of a
market intermediary, for example, is not guaranteed. A market inter-
mediary will only emerge when market conditions are favorable. Be-
cause a market intermediary will bear the costs of gathering,
processing, and verifying the information, it will only emerge when
these costs are exceeded by the price that subscribers are willing to
pay for the information. One cannot know where the tipping point is,
but one does know that the emergence of the intermediary (and inves-
tor subscription to intermediary services) is more likely by reducing
costs of information through mandatory disclosure.
There are currently various companies that provide information of
the corporate governance of public companies. RiskMetrics Group, for
example, creates a "Corporate Governance Quotient" that purports to
include some information on state corporate law, although that infor-
mation is limited to the "anti-takeover" provisions of the various
states of incorporation.' 8 6 Mandating public companies to disclose
state corporate law would reduce information costs for these in-
termediaries and promote incorporation of the information into the
price of securities at a lower cost.' 8 7 In addition, mandatory disclo-
sure would provide investors with low-cost access to information on
state corporate law when they are unsatisfied with the manner in
which the market intermediaries select, collect, present, or process the
information on state corporate law.
J. Preliminary conclusion
This section has argued that the ECMH suggests public companies
should be required to disclose certain aspects of state corporate law to
reduce investors' information costs, even though information on state
corporate law is already available through various sources. This pol-
icy would not only aid in reducing the costs of incorporating informa-
185. See supra Part IV.F (discussing the how the dominance of Delaware creates a
functional uniformity of state corporate law).
186. RiskMetrics Group, U.S. Corporate Governance Quotient Criteria, http://www.iss
proxy.com/issgovernance/esg/uscgqcriteria.html (last visited Nov. 9, 2007).
187. A mandatory disclosure system would not displace these intermediaries in the
market because many traders would still rely on the expertise of an intermediary
to process information on state corporate law.
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tion on state corporate law into the price of securities, it would also
help ensure that the information would indeed be incorporated into
securities prices when there is a real possibility the market would
have otherwise ignored some of its important aspects.
V. THE COSTS OF MANDATORY DISCLOSURE
OF STATE CORPORATE LAW
The immediately preceding sections have presented the argument
that (1) state corporate law is important to investors of public compa-
nies and (2) the mandatory disclosure of state corporate law would
reduce information costs in the market. However, although the mar-
ket may benefit from reduced information costs, it will bear other
costs of a mandatory disclosure rule. This section discusses some of
the other costs of mandatory disclosure of state corporate law.
A. Administrative costs
There are administrative costs of creating a mandatory disclosure
rule and enforcing it.188 The market bears these costs directly
through SEC filing fees, for example. It bears these costs indirectly
through taxes, some of which eventually find their way into the SEC's
budget.
As stated above, there may be some self-policing in the market that
would somewhat reduce the costs of monitoring by the SEC.189
B. Liability costs
There are the costs of the risk of liability for inaccurate disclosures.
As discussed above, one of the reasons managers would prefer not to
disclose state corporate law is because of the risk of liability for inac-
curate disclosures. 190 If they are required to disclose this information,
they may be subjected to fines, criminal penalties, or civil lawsuits for
inaccurate disclosures.
If the issuer's directors or executive officers are subject to fines or
lawsuits, the issuer will still bear most of these costs through director
and officer insurance premiums, indemnification agreements, and the
increased difficulty of attracting talented people to fill positions in the
company. Managers would also protect themselves by causing the
company to hire expensive attorneys to prepare the disclosure state-
ments and to provide legal opinions stating that the disclosures accu-
188. See Michael D. Guttentag, An Argument for Imposing Disclosure Requirements
on Public Companies, 32 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 123, 163 (2004) ("Administration
costs are the costs of constructing, monitoring, and enforcing disclosure
requirements.").
189. See Part IV.D, supra.
190. See supra note 70 and accompanying text.
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rately portray the corporate law of the state of incorporation. Once
again, it is the investors who ultimately bear these costs.
The risk of inaccurate disclosure may indeed be quite palpable
under a rule requiring disclosure of state corporate law, especially if
something more than a mechanical regurgitation of state corporate
law statutes is required. As a mandatory disclosure rule is drafted,
consideration must be given to how companies are expected to disclose
relatively indeterminate corporate law standardsl9 and inaccurate
depictions will be sanctioned. In the early years of the rule, a more
light-handed regulatory approach would allow the market to develop
standard statements of certain aspects of corporate law that are less
determinate. Self-policing mechanisms in the market may be suffi-
cient to protect investors from at least the most deliberate and egre-
gious misstatements. 192
C. Avoidance costs
Managers will often attempt to avoid mandatory disclosure by, for
example, avoiding the behavior that is subject to disclosure. This re-
sponse to mandatory disclosure may be costly to the company because
the avoidance activity may be less efficient than the activity that was
subject to disclosure.193
A regulation requiring public companies to disclose information on
state corporate law is less susceptible to these types of costs. For ex-
ample, mandatory disclosure of state corporate law might result in the
managers deciding to reincorporate in State B to avoid disclosing a
certain aspect of State A's corporate law. Alternatively, the company
may modify the effects of State A's corporate law through amendment
of the company's organizational documents. In either case, however,
the company arguably would not suffer any avoidance costs 194 be-
cause this type of behavior would not occur unless there was a market
preference for the reincorporation or the amendments to the organiza-
tional documents. In other words, these types of changes, if they actu-
ally occurred, would be a benefit of mandatory disclosure rule and not
an avoidance cost.
191. For a discussion of whether Delaware law is overly indeterminate, see Ehud
Kamar, A Regulatory Competition Theory of Indeterminacy in Corporate Law, 98
COLUM. L. REV. 1908 (1998); William T. Allen, Ambiguity in Corporation Law, 22
DEL J. CoRp. L. 894 (1997); Douglas M. Branson, Indeterminacy: The Final Ingre.
dient in an Interest Group Analysis of Corporate Law, 43 VAND. L. REV. 85 (1990).
192. See supra note 189.
193. See Guttentag, supra note 188, at 163 ("Avoidance costs refer to the distortionary
effects that disclosure can have on a company's business practices."). For a de-
tailed analysis of avoidance costs and mandatory disclosure, see Manne, supra
note 63.
194. Of course, it would suffer the costs of reincorporation or the internal administra-
tive costs of amending its charter or bylaws.
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D. "Information overload" costs
"Information overload" is another potential cost of mandatory dis-
closure.' 9 5 More information for investors will not necessarily result
in better investment decisions, even if the information is relevant. It
is initially appealing to err on the side of providing more information
because investors can sort through the information and choose to pro-
cess only the information they find most helpful.19 6 However, Profes-
sor Troy Paredes has presented the argument that providing too much
information may actually be more detrimental than providing too lit-
tle information.19 7 In fact, this principle may even apply to expert
investors as well as non-expert investors. 198
The question then becomes how the concept of information over-
load applies to help the decision about whether to require disclosure of
state corporate law. Because the details of information overload is
sketchy at best, it alone cannot justify excluding any specific informa-
tion from the mandatory disclosure regime. 19 9 Too many questions
about information overload remain unanswered;200 namely, at what
point is there too much information? Even if the point of information
overload could be identified, how does one determine what informa-
tion should be deleted and what information should be maintained?
At this point, recognition of the possibility of information overload
merely serves as a caution to require disclosure of important informa-
tion in a manner that makes it easier for investors to process. 20 1 To
that extent, a rule requiring public companies to describe a particular
state corporate law rule or standard with an explanation of how firm-
level rules (as well as exchange rules) modify or supplement it may be
appropriate.
195. See Paredes, supra note 17.
196. See id. at 435 (presenting the possibly mistaken view that "more information is
always better than less").
197. See id. at 441 ("Studies have shown that... once the information level reaches a
certain point .... the decision maker's decision quality decreases if she is given
additional information.").
198. See id. at 454 ("Several studies and experiments show that experts can become
overloaded, even if they can effectively use more information than non-experts.").
199. See id. at 451 ("[Ilt is likely that we would add certain disclosures, even if the
disclosure system were scaled back . . ").
200. See id. at 473 (stating that "before revamping our securities laws to avoid infor-
mation overload, we need more data about how people process information and
make investing decisions" and that "it would be unwise to make any significant
regulatory changes [because] [tihe risk of doing more harm than good might be
too great").
201. See id. at 474 ("Another option [to mitigate the risk of overload] is to make the
information overload, whatever it is, easier to evaluate.").
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E. Preliminary conclusion
This section has presented the potential costs of a rule requiring
public companies to disclose information about the corporate law of
their respective states of incorporation. I have refrained from making
any arguments with respect to whether the benefits of a mandatory
disclosure rule (namely, a reduction of information costs) outweigh
these costs. Because these costs are difficult to quantify, any argu-
ment on their weight relative to the benefits would be speculation. In-
stead, this section merely suggests that if it is agreed that information
on state corporate law is an important part of the information that
investors in public companies need to evaluate investment risk and
that mandatory disclosure would reduce information costs for the
market, then a rule should be carefully drafted to reduce the potential
costs of administration, liability, avoidance, and information overload.
VI. CONCLUSION
This Article has made a case for requiring public companies to dis-
close information about state corporate law as part of their regular
disclosures. State corporate law is an important part of the informa-
tion investors need to evaluate corporate governance risk. Further-
more, mandatory disclosure of state corporate law would reduce the
costs of disseminating information in a market where there are fifty-
one possible jurisdictions for which investors need to research and
process information on state corporate law. Finally, mandatory disclo-
sure of state corporate law better ensures that this information is in-
corporated into the price of securities when there is a possibility the
market largely ignores some important aspects of state corporate law.
I leave the details of the specific form and content of the disclosure
rule to further scholarship, but I do have some preliminary sugges-
tions. With respect to content, companies should be required to pro-
vide more than corporate law statutes. Corporate lawyers and
scholars would generally agree that case law provides many rules and
standards that are important to the governance of public firms.20 2
Moreover, the argument for mandatory disclosure of these judge-made
rules and standards is even stronger because the cost of acquiring this
type of information is greater than the cost of acquiring rules directly
from a state corporate law statute.20 3
Requiring disclosure of information about the institutional infra-
structure of the state of incorporation should also be considered be-
202. See Kahan & Kamar, supra note 86, at 707 (stating that "judge-made law" gov-
erns many "fundamental issues" of corporate governance).
203. See supra Part IV.C.
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cause of its effect on the quality of a state's corporate law. 20 4
However, it should be recognized that this type of mandatory disclo-
sure may put an additional burden on firms because it is not necessa-
rily something they are already gathering for internal use.
Finally, a rule should be fashioned to focus on more than state cor-
porate law regarding takeovers. There is empirical support for the
proposition that aspects of corporate law besides takeover statutes af-
fect firms' decisions where to incorporate. 20 5
With respect to the form of the disclosures, the structure of any
disclosure should mitigate the potential costs of information overload
and somewhat reduce the costs of processing the information. To that
end, the company's disclosures of state corporate law should be organ-
ized together with other corporate governance information that is cur-
rently part of its required disclosures. For example, the disclosure
would (1) present the state's corporate law on an issue, (2) explain
whether and how the company's firm-level rules have adopted or mod-
ified the rule, and (3) explain who has the power to change the firm-
level rule-the board of directors, the shareholders, or some combina-
tion of the two.
As I stated in the Introduction, because the United States has cho-
sen a federal mandatory disclosure system, there must be continuous
debate with respect to the content of mandatory disclosure. Although
the additional burdens placed on public companies by the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act of 2002 may make the thought of yet more disclosure re-
quirements unpalatable for some scholars and policymakers, the pos-
sibility should still be evaluated, and the disclosure of information on
state corporate law should be high on the agenda of the ongoing
mandatory disclosure debate.
204. See Bebchuk & Hamdani, supra note 3, at 580-81 ("The presence of this institu-
tional infrastructure is an important component of the quality of the system of-
fered by Delaware.").
205. Kahan, supra note 105.
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